



I'm not robot



Continue

## Osama bin laden cia report

Shortly after the attack on the usama bin Ladin (UBL) compound on May 1, 2011, which resulted in the death of the UBL, CIA officials said cia detainees provided the reporting of information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, the facilitator bin Laden whose identification and tracking led to the identification of the UBL compound and the operation that resulted in the death of the UBL. However, CIA records indicate that the information identified by the CIA as the most critical -- or the most valuable -- about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was not related to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation technique, provided fabricated, inconsistent and generally unreliable information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti during his detention. Much information was acquired by the CIA prior to any report on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti from CIA detainees, as early as January 1, 2002, found in March 2002 on Abu Zubaydah's agenda under the title Abu Ahmad K. The CIA also obtained an email address believed to be associated with Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and was collecting and tracking [his] email activity as early as August 24, 2002. The CIA also received from a foreign government an email address that al-Kuwaiti shared ... with Ammar al-Baluchi (a conspirator charged on September 11), and when KSM was captured in 2003, the CIA found an email address associated with al-Kuwaiti on a laptop believed to be used by KSM. The CIA received reports between June and October 2002 from four detainees in the custody of a foreign government indicating that al-Kuwaiti was involved in planning an operational attack with KSM, that al-Kuwaiti was close to KSM and worked on covert operations with KSM, that he was supporting KSM's operational attack planning targeting the United States and gave funding and funding instructions to Hassan Ghul. The CIA received more information between September 2001 and October 2002 from detainees held in the custody of u.S. foreign and military governments about al-Kuwaiti's age, physical description and family. From April to August 2002, three detainees - Ridha al-Najjar, Riyadh, the Facilitator, and Abu Zubair al-Ha'iliand - near the OBL and in the custody of foreign governments - provided information that al-Kuwaiti may have served as a courier for the UBL, traveled frequently to meet with Usama bin Ladin, and was one of the few close associates of Usama bin Laden. However, CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell, CIA Director Leon Panetta and other CIA officers gave confidential instructions to the Senate Intelligence Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 2 and 4, 2011, indicating that intelligence from CIA detainees -- and the enhanced CIA strengthened played a substantial role in the development of intelligence that led to the UBL operation. This testimony contained significant inaccurate information. The CIA provided a document to the Senate Intelligence Committee on May 5, 2011 titled The Detainees Report on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti that identified 12 high-value detainees and 13 medium-value detainees who discussed Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti's long-term support of al-Qa'ida and his historical role as a messenger for Usama bin Laden. The document also stated that nine of the high-value detainees providing 'Level 1' information were subjected to advanced CIA interrogation techniques, two of which were drowned and four medium-value detainees who provided general information were submitted to advanced CIA interrogation techniques. , list 25 detainees who the CIA claimed to provide information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, 16 of whom were in CIA custody. However, the Document of May 5, 2011 omitted the fact that most of the accurate information acquired in Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was collected outside the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program, whether from detainees who are not in CIA custody, or from other intelligence sources and methods unrelated to detainees, to include human sources and foreign partners. In fact, five of the 12 high-value detainees provided information about al-Kuwaiti before entering CIA custody, and other high-value detainees who were not in CIA custody, such as Abu Zubair al-Ha'ili, provided information linking Abu Ahmad to Bin Ladin, and were not included in the CIA list. advanced CIA interrogation techniques, and that three of the other four high-value detainees were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA's use of advanced interrogation techniques. The only high-profile detainee who was subjected to advanced interrogation techniques —Zubaydah—did not provide any information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, and the CIA described this information as speculative. Finally, he omitted that two of the four medium-value detainees provided information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti before entering CIA custody, were not included in the list of 13 detainees. The document of 3 October 2012 mistook the total number of detainees who provided information on omitting those who are not in CIA custody, which included 2002 reporting that al-Kuwaiti was one of the few [Bin Laden] associates.' It also left out the fact that the vast majority of the information acquired in Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti was originally acquired from sources unrelated to the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, and the fact that the most accurate information acquired from a CIA detainee was provided before the CIA subdued [him] to the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. In fact, at least seven of the 16 CIA detainees provided reports on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti before being transferred to CIA custody, and seven of the 13 detainees listed as having been subjected to advanced CIA interrogation techniques provided information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti before being subjected to those techniques. The second document also did not mention that five of the six remaining detainees were not substantially questioned on any topic prior to the CIA's use of advanced interrogation techniques, and that the CIA assessed that all the information they gave was fabricated and intentionally misleading or limited, not unique. The remaining detainee, Zubaydah, did not provide information about Abu Ahmad al Kuwaiti until August 25, 2005, intelligence that ... was described by CIA officials at the time as speculative. In addition, both documents omitted the fact that two of the three drowned detainees —Abu Zubaydah and KSM— withheld information about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, including denying any significant connection between al-Kuwaiti and UBL. They failed to provide accurate information likely known to them about Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti and/or fabricated information to protect him. Both documents also did not mention that according to CIA records, Hassan Ghul, who provided the most accurate 'Level 1' information linking Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti to the UBL, described al-Kuwaiti as the OBL's closest assistant, and stated that the UBL security system would be minimal, and that the group probably lived in a house with a family somewhere in Pakistan, opened immediately and cooperated from the outset and provided the information before being submitted to advanced CIA interrogation techniques. Ghul was then transferred to the CIA's Black Detention Site, and cia office approved the request to use advanced interrogation techniques, and [d]uring and after the use of advanced CIA interrogation techniques Ghul did not provide any other substance information about al-Kuwaiti. In addition, the CIA noted internally that cia detainee reports -- specifically CIA detainees subjected to advanced CIA interrogation techniques -- were insufficient, fabricated, and/or unreliable. Such internal CIA documents include a report on the ubl search dated September 1, 2005, a study directed at al-Kuwaiti as of May 20, 2007, and an intelligence document on al-Kuwaiti as of November 23, 2007 titled Probable suspect Bin Ladin Facilitator Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti. In addition, a CIA cable from May 1, May, in relation to the efforts against al-Kuwaiti states that the HQS judges who hold [al-Kuwaiti] should be a last resort, since we were unsuccessful in obtaining actionable information about bin Ladin's location of any detainees. Initial information related to detainees linking al-Kuwaiti to bin Laden and KSM came not from CIA detainees, but from detainees who were not in CIA custody.

